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Abstract
Some of the recent blockchain proposals, such as Stellar and Ripple, use quorum-like structures
typical for Byzantine consensus while allowing for open membership. This is achieved by con-
structing quorums in a decentralised way: each participant independently chooses whom to trust,
and quorums arise from these individual decisions. Unfortunately, the theoretical foundations
underlying such blockchains have not been thoroughly investigated. To close this gap, in this
paper we study decentralised quorum construction by means of federated Byzantine quorum sys-
tems, used by Stellar. We rigorously prove the correctness of basic broadcast abstractions over
federated quorum systems and establish their relationship to the classical Byzantine quorum sys-
tems. In particular, we prove correctness in the realistic setting where Byzantine nodes may lie
about their trust choices. We show that this setting leads to a novel variant of Byzantine quorum
systems where di erent nodes may have di erent understanding of what constitutes a quorum.
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1 Introduction
Blockchains are distributed databases that maintain an append-only ledger over a set of
potentially Byzantine nodes. The nodes use a Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) consensus
protocol to agree on a total order in which transactions are appended to the ledger. Block-
chains usually come in two flavours. Permissioned blockchains assume a known set of par-
ticipants, and are often based on classical BFT consensus protocols, such as PBFT [5]. In
these protocols consensus is reached once a quorum of participants agrees on the same de-
cision. Quorums can be defined as sets containing enough nodes in the system, e.g., 2f + 1
out of 3f + 1, assuming at most f failures. They can also be defined by a more general
structure called a Byzantine quorum system (BQS) [9]—a pair of a quorum system Q and
a fail-prone system B, the latter containing the sets of nodes characterising possible failure
scenarios [9]. A subclass of dissemination quorum systems (DQS) requires Q and B to satisfy
certain additional axioms, e.g., that any two quorums must intersect in a non-faulty node.
The other kind of blockchains are permissionless ones, which allow anyone to particip-
ate in consensus, with the membership constantly changing. These blockchains are often
based on consensus protocols such as proof-of-work [7, 11], which do not rely on quorums.
Despite the advantages of open membership, proof-of-work su ers from a number of draw-
backs, including high energy consumption and the absence of hard guarantees on when a
transaction can be considered successfully appended to the ledger. This has motivated a
number of proposals of alternative architectures for permissionless blockchains. In this pa-
per we focus on an intriguing new class of blockchains, such as Stellar [10] and Ripple [12],
that use quorum-like structures typical for BFT consensus while allowing open membership.
2 Federated Byzantine Quorum Systems
This is achieved by constructing the quorum system in a decentralised way: each protocol
participant independently chooses whom to trust, and quorums arise from these individual
decisions.
In particular, in Stellar trust assumptions are specified using a federated Byzantine
quorum system (FBQS)1, where each participant selects a set of quorum slices—sets of
nodes each of which would convince the participant to accept the validity of a given state-
ment. Quorums are defined as sets of nodes U such that each node in U has some quorum
slice fully within U , so that the nodes in a quorum can potentially reach an agreement.
Consensus is then implemented by a fairly intricate protocol whose key component is feder-
ated voting—a protocol similar to Bracha’s protocol for reliable Byzantine broadcast [2, 3].
Importantly, the decentralised nature of Stellar means that its participants operate based on
an incomplete and inconsistent information about the trust assumptions of various nodes.
First, a node may not have complete knowledge of quorum slices of all other nodes in the
system. Second, Byzantine nodes may lie to other nodes about their choices of quorum
slices. These features make establishing the correctness of the protocols underlying Stellar
nontrivial.
Even though Stellar has been deployed as a functioning blockchain, its theoretical found-
ations remain shaky. The core Stellar protocols lack rigorous formalisations and proofs of
correctness. Furthermore, as observed in [4], the federated quorum structures arising in
Stellar are similar to the classical Byzantine quorum systems, where trust assumptions are
defined globally for the whole system [9]. But the relationship between these has not been
investigated, and this is a barrier to transferring ideas between the classical and the feder-
ated settings. In this paper we take the first step towards closing these gaps and perform a
rigorous theoretical study of the basic concepts underlying the Stellar blockchain.
In more detail, the closest protocol to Stellar’s core federated voting protocol in the world
of classical Byzantine quorum systems is Bracha broadcast [2]. This implements reliable
Byzantine broadcast [3] in a system of 3f + 1 processes where at most f processes can
fail and any 2f + 1 processes constitute a quorum. The protocol allows a node to send
a message to a group of receivers; the sender may be faulty and can thus send di erent
messages to di erent receivers. The protocol guarantees, among other properties, that: (i)
correct receivers cannot deliver di erent messages; and (ii) if a correct receiver delivers a
message, then eventually all correct receivers will deliver the same message [3]. Bracha’s
protocol can also be executed over an arbitrary dissemination quorum system (which we
prove in §2).
We investigate Stellar’s federated voting through the prism of the reliable Byzantine
broadcast abstraction. We first consider an idealised setting (used in the Stellar whitepa-
per [10]) where nodes have consistent information about the quorum slices of nodes they in-
teract with, i.e., faulty nodes do not equivocate about their quorum slices, but can otherwise
behave arbitrarily. Thus, all nodes act according to the same FBQS. Our first contribution
is to show that, in this setting, a federated Byzantine quorum system used in Stellar induces
a classical Byzantine quorum system (Q,B), so that protocols such as Bracha broadcast can
also be run out of the box in a federated setting (§3). However, Bracha broadcast requires
a node to know the fail-prone system B, and computing it from an FBQS would require
the node to know the quorum slices of all the nodes in the system. This is infeasible in
1 In the Stellar whitepaper these are called federated Byzantine agreement systems [10]. The name used
in this paper is chosen to be in line with common terminology [9] and to emphasise that these systems
can be used for purposes other than solving consensus.
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a system with open membership. Stellar circumvents this problem by allowing a node to
take decisions based solely on the quorum slices of the nodes it interacts with directly. Our
next contribution is to prove that the resulting Stellar broadcast implements what we call
weakly reliable Byzantine broadcast (§4). This guarantees the safety property (i) of the usual
reliable Byzantine broadcast and the liveness property (ii) where only certain intact nodes
are guaranteed to deliver the message. In a given protocol execution, the set of intact nodes
is the largest set that excludes all faulty nodes and satisfies certain basic properties allow-
ing correct protocol operation among these nodes, e.g., that every two quorums intersect.
This result strengthens the correctness theorems in the Stellar whitepaper [10], which only
guarantee safety to intact nodes (instead of all correct ones) and guarantee liveness only
under an assumption that an intact node delivers a message (rather than only correct one).
We also show that a variation of the Stellar protocol actually implements the usual reliable
Byzantine broadcast and prove that this variation is observationally equivalent to Bracha
broadcast over the corresponding DQS. On a conceptual level, our correctness results show
that some of the ad hoc protocols proposed for Stellar actually implement a variant of a
well-known broadcast abstraction.
We next consider a more realistic setting where faulty nodes may lie about their choices
of quorum slices (§5), which has not been covered by the existing correctness theorems for
Stellar [10]. In this setting, di erent nodes may have di erent understanding of what the
quorum slices of a given faulty node are. We capture this by the notion of a subjective
FBQS, where each node has its own, possibly di erent, copy of an FBQS such that the
di erent FBQSes agree on the quorum slices of correct nodes. This also leads di erent
nodes to disagree on what constitutes a quorum. More precisely, a subjective FBQS induces
a subjective quorum system, where each node has its own copy of a quorum system such that
the projections of di erent quorum systems to correct nodes coincide. Our next result is to
show that the Stellar broadcast correctly implements weakly reliable Byzantine broadcast
even when each node acts according to its subjective view on the trust choices in the system.
This result is required to get confidence in the correctness of the Stellar blockchain, since in
its intended deployment faulty nodes may lie about everything, including their trust choices.
Finally, we generalise the theory of classical Byzantine quorum systems to allow for nodes
to have inconsistent information about quorums, regardless of the origin of this inconsist-
ency (§6); this may be useful in the future for dealing with approaches to decentralising
trust di erent from Stellar. To this end, we introduce the notion of a subjective dissemina-
tion quorum system, where each node has its own Byzantine quorum system such that the
di erent systems satisfy a variation on the DQS axioms. For example, we require that any
two quorums, even when coming from the systems of di erent nodes, have to intersect in a
non-faulty node. We show that Bracha broadcast over a subjective DQS implements reliable
Byzantine broadcast. Furthermore, we show that a subjective FBQS induces a subjective
DQS, on top of which one can execute Bracha broadcast.
Our results open the door to a deeper theoretical study of the novel quorum structures
arising in a federated setting and to proving the correctness of the whole Stellar consensus
protocol. We also hope that the connections we have established between classical broadcast
abstractions and the novel Stellar protocols will enable transferring ideas from the existing
optimised protocols for BFT consensus [6, 8] into the federated setting.
Proofs of the theorems stated in the paper are given in appendices.
4 Federated Byzantine Quorum Systems
2 Byzantine Quorum Systems and Bracha Broadcast
System model. In this paper we consider a system consisting of a set of client nodes C and
a disjoint set of server nodes V. We assume a Byzantine failure model: some nodes may be
faulty, in which case they can deviate arbitrarily from their specification. All other nodes are
called correct. We assume that any two nodes (clients or servers) can communicate over an
asynchronous point-to-point channel. If both endpoints of the channel are correct, then this
channel is both authenticated and reliable: a correct node receives a message from another
correct node if and only if the latter node sent it.
Byzantine quorum systems. A quorum system is a non-empty set Q of subsets of some
universe of nodes, such that
every quorum in Q is non-empty;
any two quorums in Q intersect: ’U1, U2 œ Q. U1 fl U2 ”= ÿ;
Q is closed under union: ’U1, U2 œ Q. U1 fi U2 œ Q.
In this paper we let the universe of nodes coincide with the set of servers V, so that Q ™ 2V.
A fail-prone system B is a non-empty set of subsets of V such that none of its elements is
contained in another. A fail-prone system characterises the failure scenarios that can occur:
in any execution of the system, some B œ B is meant to contain all the faulty servers.
A Byzantine quorum system (BQS) is a pair (Q,B) of a quorum system and a fail-prone
system. We sometimes use the adjective ‘classical’ to distinguish such quorum systems from
federated ones that we define in §3.
In this paper we focus on a particular class of BQSes that satisfy additional properties.
Namely, a dissemination quorum system (DQS) is a BQS with the following properties [9]:
D-consistency: ’U1, U2 œ Q.’B œ B. U1 fl U2 ”™ B; and
D-availability: ’B œ B.÷U œ Q. U flB = ÿ.
Informally, D-consistency ensures that any two quorums must intersect in a correct server.
D-availability ensures the existence of a quorum containing only correct servers.
I Example 1. Consider a universe V with 3f +1 servers, a quorum system Q that contains
every set with at least 2f + 1 servers, and a fail-prone system B that contains every set
with exactly f servers. Then (Q,B) is a DQS. Indeed, D-consistency holds because any
two quorums have at least f + 1 servers in common, at least one of which must be correct.
D-availability holds because, for each B œ B, the set V \B has 2f + 1 servers and is thus a
quorum in Q.
I Example 2. Consider the universe V = {1, 2, 3, 4}, the quorum system
Q = {{1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}
and the fail-prone system B = {{2}, {3, 4}}. Then (Q,B) is a DQS. D-consistency holds
because all quorums in Q intersect at 1, which does not belong to any element of B. D-
availability holds because both {1, 3, 4} and {1, 2} are quorums.
Bracha broadcast over DQS. We next consider the abstraction of reliable Byzantine broad-
cast and show that a generalisation of Bracha broadcast [2] implements it when executed
over an arbitrary dissemination quorum system. This protocol is the closest one from the
world of classical BQSes that matches the broadcast protocol used in Stellar, and we relate
the two in the following sections.
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1 process client(c œ C)
2 broadcast(a)
3 send BCAST(a) to every v œ V;
4 process server(v œ V)
5 echoed, ready, deliveredΩ   œ Bool;
6 when received BCAST(a) from c and echoed =  
7 echoedΩ tt;
8 send ECHO(a) to every vÕ œ V;
9 when received ECHO(a) from every u œ U for some U œ Q and ready =  
10 readyΩ tt;
11 send READY(a) to every vÕ œ V;
12 when received READY(a) from every u œ B for some B œ 2V \ {ÿ} such
that ’BÕ œ B. B ”™ BÕ and ready =  
13 readyΩ tt;
14 send READY(a) to every vÕ œ V;
15 when received READY(a) from every u œ U for some U œ Q and
delivered =  
16 deliveredΩ tt;
17 deliver(a);
Figure 1 Bracha broadcast over an arbitrary DQS (Q,B).
The broadcast allows a distinguished client to broadcast a value a to a group of servers,
an event which we denote broadcast(a). We denote the event of a server delivering a value a
as deliver(a). Both the sender and some of the receivers can be Byzantine. Reliable Byzantine
broadcast is defined by the following properties [3]:
Validity: If the sender client is correct and broadcasts a value a, then every correct server
eventually delivers a.
No duplication: Every correct server delivers at most one value.
Integrity: If some correct server delivers a value a and the sender client is correct, then
a was previously broadcast by the sender.
Consistency: If some correct server delivers a value a and another correct server delivers
a value aÕ, then a = aÕ.
Totality: If a correct server delivers a value, then every correct server eventually delivers
a value.
The Validity property ensures that the broadcast operates as expected when the sender is
correct. When the sender is faulty, the above properties guarantee that servers may not
deliver contradictory values, even if the sender sends di erent values to di erent servers. In
this case they may also not deliver any value at all, but the liveness property of Totality
ensures that all correct servers behave the same in this respect.
In Figure 1 we present an implementation of reliable Byzantine broadcast over a DQS
(Q,B). This generalises Bracha’s protocol [2] for reliable Byzantine broadcast, which works
over the cardinality-based DQS from Example 1. In order to broadcast a value a, the client
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sends a BCAST(a) message to every server (line 2). Servers process client messages in several
phases, with progress denoted by several Boolean flags (line 5).
Since a faulty client may send contradictory messages to di erent servers, to ensure
Consistency the servers first cross-check the client’s proposals. A server that receives a
message BCAST(a) for the first time sends an ECHO(a) message to all servers (including itself,
for uniformity; line 6). When the server receives a quorum of ECHO(a) messages, it sends a
READY(a) message to every server, signalling its willingness to deliver the value a (line 9).
Note that correct servers cannot send READY messages in this way with two di erent values:
this would require two quorums of ECHO messages with di erent values, but by D-consistency
these quorums would intersect in a correct server, which cannot send contradictory ECHO
messages. When a server receives a quorum of READY(a) messages, it delivers a (line 15).
The exchange of READY messages is necessary to ensure Totality: it guarantees that, if a
correct server delivers a value, other correct servers have enough information to also deliver
the value. This relies on an additional rule in line 12, allowing a server to send a READY(a)
message even if it previously echoed a di erent value: this is done if the server receives
READY(a) from each member of a set B that is not a subset of any element of B. In this case
at least one of the servers in B must be correct, and hence, we can trust that the value it
proposes has been cross-checked for consistency by a quorum.
I Theorem 3. Let (Q,B) be a DQS. Then the protocol in Figure 1 satisfies the specification
of reliable Byzantine where all faulty servers belong to some element of B.
The next example shows that removing the handler at line 12 of Figure 1 would under-
mine Totality.
I Example 4. Consider the DQS (Q,B) from Example 1, where quorums and fail-prone
sets are defined by their cardinalities, and let f = 1 with a total number of 4 servers. As
before, assume servers 1, 2 and 4 are correct, and 3 is faulty. Let the sender be faulty and
send contradictory BCAST(a) and BCAST(aÕ) messages to the sets {1, 2} and {4}, respectively.
Imagine faulty 3 sends ECHO(a) to 1 and 2 and never sends anything to 4. Then both 1 and 2
will send READY(a) to every server thanks to the conditions in line 9. If now 3 sends READY(a)
to 1 and 2, then both will deliver value a thanks to the conditions in line 15. However, correct
4 cannot send READY(a) and thus cannot deliver a, because it never receives ECHO(a) from
a quorum. But correct 1 and 2 did deliver a. By enabling the handler at line 12, 4 would
send READY(a) to every server after receiving READY(a) from 1 and 2, because any set of two
servers is not contained in any of the elements of B, which are singletons. After receiving
READY(a) from 1, 2 and 4, server 4 will also deliver a thanks to the conditions in line 15.
The next example demonstrates that delivering values right after receiving a quorum of
ECHO messages would also undermine Totality, thus motivating the need for READY messages.
I Example 5. Consider the DQS (Q,B) and the set of faulty servers from Example 4 and
assume that the sender is faulty and sends contradictory BCAST(a) and BCAST(aÕ)messages to
the sets {1} and {2, 4}, respectively. Imagine 3 sends ECHO(aÕ) to 2. Then 2 receives ECHO(aÕ)
from the quorum {2, 3, 4}. Imagine now that the faulty server 3 stops sending messages.
If servers delivered values after receiving a quorum of ECHO messages, then correct server 2
would deliver aÕ, but correct servers 1 and 4 would never deliver any value.
3 Federated Byzantine Quorum Systems
FBQS definition. We now consider federated Byzantine quorum systems (FBQS), which
are used in the Stellar blockchain to construct quorums from the trust choices of individual
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participants [10]. An FBQS is a function S : Væ 22V \ {ÿ} that specifies the set of quorum
slices for each server, ranged over by q. We require that a server belong to all of its own
quorum slices: ’v œ V.’q œ S(v). v œ q. Quorum slices reflect the trust choices of each
server: a server can be convinced to accept the validity of a statement by any of its slices.
An FBQS specifies quorum slices for all servers. However, to participate in a protocol
such as reliable broadcast or consensus, a server may not need to know the whole FBQS,
which is infeasible in a system with open membership. Instead, it may be su cient for the
server to know only the quorum slices for the servers it interacts with, which it can receive
directly from these servers. A complication is that faulty servers may lie about their quorum
slices and, in particular, give contradictory information to their peers. In this section we
consider an idealised setting (used in the Stellar whitepaper [10]) that assumes this does not
happen: faulty servers do not equivocate about their quorum slices, even though they can
otherwise behave arbitrarily. Hence, every server knows a part of the same FBQS S. We
lift this assumption in §5.
A non-empty set of servers U ™ V is a quorum in an FBQS S if U contains a slice for
each member: ’v œ U.÷q œ S(v). q ™ U . Note that a server can check whether U is a
quorum based solely on the quorum slices of its participants. Hence, a server can discover
quorums without knowing a complete FBQS by probing di erent servers until it finds a set
forming a quorum. Alternatively, (signed) information about quorum slices of a given server
can be transitively propagated via chains of trust dependencies, with each server receiving
information from the servers in its slices. We say that an FBQS enjoys quorum intersection
when any two of its quorums intersect. An FBQS S with quorum intersection induces a
quorum system Q consisting of its quorums.
I Example 6. Consider an FBQS with 3f +1 servers where every server has a slice for each
set of 2f + 1 servers. This FBQS induces the quorum system Q from from Example 1: any
set of 2f + 1 or more servers is a quorum.
I Example 7. Consider the following FBQS, where each server has only one slice determined
by outgoing arrows, except server 1, which has two slices respectively determined by the solid
and the dashed arrows (we omit self-loops in the diagram to avoid clutter). This FBQS
induces the quorum system Q from Example 2.
1 2
3 4
S(1) = {{1, 2}, {1, 4}}
S(2) = {{1, 2}}
S(3) = {{1, 3}}
S(4) = {{3, 4}}
Intact servers. The correctness of protocols over FBQSes is stated using the following
notion of intact servers [10]. Informally, the set of intact servers is the biggest one that
excludes all faulty servers and still yields a quorum system that satisfies certain properties
allowing correct protocol operation within this set. Formally, consider an FBQS S and a
set of servers I. We define the projection S|I of S to I as the FBQS over universe I defined
as follows: S|I(v) = {q fl I | q œ S(v)}. Given a set of faulty servers Vbad, the set of intact
servers Vint is the biggest set such that
all servers in Vint are correct: Vint flVbad = ÿ;
if Vint is non-empty, then it is a quorum in S;
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S|Vint enjoys quorum intersection.
We call the servers in V \ Vint befouled. Informally, even though befouled servers may
be correct, they “trust wrong guys” and thus protocols we consider may not guarantee all
correctness properties for them.
I Proposition 8. The set of intact servers in an FBQS with quorum intersection is well-
defined.
For the FBQS from Example 6, which corresponds to a cardinality-based DQS, the
notions of correct and intact coincide. However, this is not the case for the FBQS S from
Example 7. Namely, assume servers 1, 2 and 4 are correct and server 3 is faulty. The set
{1, 2} is a quorum in S, and S|{1,2} satisfies quorum intersection. Furthermore, adding the
correct server 4 to the set {1, 2} does not result in a quorum in S. Hence, servers 1 and 2
are intact and server 4 is correct, but befouled. Intact servers satisfy the following useful
property [10], which is similar to the D-consistency property of DQSes.
I Proposition 9. Consider an FBQS S with quorum intersection. Fix a set of faulty servers
and assume that there exists at least one intact server in S. Then the intersection of every
two quorums in S contains some intact server.
From federated to classical quorum systems. We now show that every FBQS induces a
corresponding DQS. An FBQS does not explicitly specify the possible failure scenarios, since
in a setting with open membership one cannot easily predict them. Hence, to construct a
fail-prone system for an FBQS, we consider all possible failures that do not bring the whole
system down, i.e., leave at least some servers intact.
I Theorem 10. Consider an FBQS S with quorum intersection. Let Q be the quorum
system it induces and let B consist of the maximal sets B such that the failure of B leaves
the set of intact servers in S non-empty. Then (Q,B) is a DQS.
We say that FBQS S induces the DQS (Q,B) from the theorem. For example, the FBQS
S from Example 6 induces the DQS from Example 1. Similarly, the FBQS S from Example 7
induces the DQS from Example 2. Indeed, the failure of server 2 leaves 1, 3 and 4 intact, and
the failure of 3 and 4 leaves 1 and 2 intact. Extending either of these failure sets leaves no
servers intact. The correspondence stated by Theorem 10 allows us to run any o -the-shelf
protocol over a DQS on top of an FBQS with at least one intact server. In particular, the
following corollary of Theorems 3 and 10 shows that this is the case for Bracha broadcast.
I Corollary 11. Let S be an FBQS with quorum intersection and (Q,B) be the DQS it in-
duces. Then the protocol in Figure 1 satisfies the specification of reliable Byzantine broadcast
in executions where at least one server in S is intact.
Note that, unlike in Theorem 3, where the assumption on the allowed failure scenarios
was stated using a given B, here this is done by requiring the existence of at least one intact
server. For example, consider the FBQS from Example 6. The existence of an intact server
in this FBQS is equivalent to requiring that no more than f servers fail, which corresponds
to the standard requirement for the cardinality-based DQS (Example 1).
4 Stellar Broadcast and its Correctness
Stellar broadcast. Despite Corollary 11, using Bracha broadcast in a federated setting is
problematic. While servers can discover quorums in Q without knowing the whole FBQS,
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Bracha broadcast also requires participants to know the fail-prone system B (line 12). Com-
puting the B induced by S requires knowing the quorum slices of all participants, which is
infeasible in a system with open membership. Stellar solves this problem by replacing the
condition in line 12 by one that a server can check locally. We now present and prove correct
the corresponding broadcast protocol, which is a reformulation of Stellar’s federated voting
protocol; we call the resulting protocol the Stellar broadcast.
Given an FBQS S and a server v, a set of servers B is called v-blocking if B overlaps each
quorum slice in S(v). The Stellar broadcast is obtained from Bracha broadcast in Figure 1
by making the following changes to three lines:
9: when received ECHO(a) from each u œ U for some U œ Q such that v œ U
and ready =   ;
12: when received READY(a) from every u œ B for some v-blocking B œ 2V\{ÿ}
and ready =   ;
15: when received READY(a) from every u œ U for some U œ Q
such that v œ U and delivered =   ,
where v is the server executing the code. The new checks at lines 9 and 15 require a server
to only accept information from quorums it belongs to. The new check at line 12 depends
only on the slices of v and can thus be performed locally. This allows v to operate even when
knowing only the part of the FBQS corresponding to the servers it directly interacts with.
The role of the new check in line 12 resembles that of the old check in Figure 1. The old
check guaranteed that the server v has received at least one READY(a) message from a correct
server. Due to the following proposition, the new check guarantees that, if v is intact, then
it has received at least one READY(a) message from an intact server.
I Proposition 12. Assume an FBQS S with quorum intersection. For a given set of faulty
servers, the set Vbef of befouled servers is not v-blocking for any intact v.
Proof. Consider an intact server v. The set of all intact servers Vint = V\Vbef is a quorum
in S. Then there exists a slice q œ S(v) such that q ™ Vint. Hence, Vbef cannot overlap all
of v’s slices, as required. J
As it happens, the Stellar broadcast does not implement reliable Byzantine broadcast,
but only its weaker version, which we call weakly reliable Byzantine broadcast. This weakens
the properties of Validity and Totality (§2) by guaranteeing them only to intact servers:
Validity for intact servers: If the sender client is correct and broadcasts a value a, then
every intact server eventually delivers a.
Totality for intact servers: If a correct server delivers a value, then every intact server
eventually delivers a value.
As we noted above, for the cardinality-based quorum system from Example 1 the notions
of intact and correct coincide. Hence, for this quorum system the weak and the classical
broadcast abstractions coincide as well.
I Theorem 13. Let S be an FBQS with quorum intersection. The protocol in Figure 1 over
S with the changed lines 9, 12 and 15 satisfies the specification of weakly reliable Byzantine
broadcast in executions where at least one server in S is intact.
As the next example illustrates, the Stellar broadcast does not satisfy the Totality prop-
erty of reliable Byzantine broadcast.
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I Example 14. Consider the FBQS S from Example 7. Assume the sender is faulty and it
sends contradictory BCAST(a) and BCAST(aÕ) messages to the sets {1, 2} and {4} respectively.
Servers 1 and 2 will receive ECHO(a) from the quorum {1, 2}, and by the conditions in the
changed lines 9 and 15, they will then send READY(a) to every server and deliver value a.
However, 4 will not be able to deliver a, because it will receive READY(a) from the set {1, 2},
which is a quorum to which 4 does not belong.
The condition in the Stellar broadcast that a server only accepts information from quor-
ums it belongs to (lines 9 and 15) is not strictly required to allow a server to operate without
the knowledge of the whole system: a server can ensure that a set of servers is a quorum
based on the quorum slices of its participants, regardless of whether the server is one of them.
If we drop the above condition, then the protocol implements the usual reliable Byzantine
broadcast.
I Theorem 15. Let S be an FBQS with quorum intersection. The protocol in Figure 1
over S with the changed line 12 satisfies the specification of reliable Byzantine broadcast in
executions where at least one server in S is intact.
The above theorems yield several novel insights with respect to the existing results about
Stellar. First, they show that some of the ad hoc protocols proposed for Stellar actually
implement a variant of a well-known broadcast abstraction. Second, the theorems strengthen
the existing correctness theorems for Stellar’s federated voting [10]. Namely, we guarantee
Consistency for all correct servers, whereas the Consistency property proved for federated
voting [10, Theorem 9] applies only to a subset of correct servers I such that S|I enjoys
quorum intersection. The di erence is significant in practice, since a server cannot easily
find out if it belongs to such a subset. The Totality property proved for federated voting [10,
Theorem 11] requires an intact server to deliver a value, whereas we show that a correct
server delivering a value is enough for all intact servers to also deliver the value. Our
theorems also show that, assuming the existence of at least one intact server, the guarantees
provided by the protocol can be strengthened if a server accepts information from quorums
it does not participate in. In §5 we strengthen our correctness statements even further by
considering the case when faulty servers may equivocate about their quorum slices.
Proving correctness. We give the key steps in proving Theorem 13, which we revisit in
§5 to show that the protocol also works when faulty servers equivocate about their quorum
slices. The following lemma is used to establish Consistency.
I Lemma 16. Assume an FBQS S with quorum intersection. If intact servers in an exe-
cution of Stellar broadcast over S send messages READY(a) and READY(aÕ), then a = aÕ.
Proof sketch. To prove this lemma, using Proposition 12 we establish that, if intact servers
send messages READY(a) and READY(aÕ), then some (possibly di erent) intact servers receive
quorums of messages ECHO(a) and ECHO(aÕ), respectively. By Proposition 9 these quorums
have to intersect in an intact server, which is also correct and thus cannot send contradictory
ECHO messages. J
Proof sketch for Consistency. Assume that correct servers deliver values a and aÕ. Then
by the condition in the changed line 15, the corresponding servers received a quorum of
READY(a) and READY(aÕ) messages, respectively. Since at least one server in S is intact, the
set of intact servers forms a quorum. Then, since S has quorum intersection, each of the
quorums that sent the READY(a) and READY(aÕ) messages must contain at least one intact
server. But then by Lemma 16 we have a = aÕ, as required. J
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The next lemma is used to prove Totality.
I Lemma 17. Let S be an FBQS with quorum intersection. Consider an execution of the
Stellar broadcast with the set of intact servers in S being Vint ”= ÿ. Assume that Vint =
V + ‡ V ≠ and for some quorum U we have U flVint ™ V +. Then either V ≠ = ÿ or there
exists some server v œ V ≠ such that V + is v-blocking.
Proof sketch for Totality. Delivering a value a at an intact server requires this server to
receive READY(a) messages from a quorum U . Since the set of intact servers forms a quorum
and any two quorums intersect, the quorum U must contain some intact servers. Using the
above lemma, we can then show that, as the READY(a) messages from these intact servers
propagate through the system, more and more intact servers will execute the handler at
line 12 and send READY(a) messages themselves. When applying the lemma, the set V + is
the set of intact servers that have sent READY(a) and V ≠ the set of intact servers that have
not done so yet. The lemma ensures that in the end all intact servers will send READY(a)
and will be able to deliver a. J
Observational equivalence. We now establish a tighter correspondence between the Stellar
broadcast over an FBQS and Bracha broadcast over the corresponding BQS: we show that
Bracha broadcast is observationally equivalent to the version of the Stellar broadcast with
the changed line 12 only. Informally, this means that any externally observable behaviour
of one of the protocols can also be produced by the other. Note that this relationship does
not simply follow from the fact that the two broadcasts implement the same specification,
because the specification is non-deterministic: when the sender is faulty and sends contra-
dictory values, it allows receivers to pick one value to deliver, or not to deliver any value
at all. The equivalence thus shows that, whenever servers in one of the protocols decide to
deliver a value, there is an execution of the other protocol (with some behaviour of faulty
servers) that also delivers the same value.
We formulate the equivalence using the following notion. A history H is a set of events in
an execution of a broadcast protocol that includes the reception of the first BCAST message
received by each server and the triggering of the deliver primitive by each server. A history
captures the initial communication between the clients and the system and the outcome of
the protocol’s execution that is observable by applications running at the servers.
I Theorem 18. Let S be an FBQS with quorum intersection. Fix the sets of faulty and
correct servers such that at least one intact server exists in S, and let (Q,B) be the DQS
that S induces.
(i) For every execution of Bracha broadcast over (Q,B) with a history H, there exists an
execution of the Stellar broadcast over S with the changed line 12 that also entails H.
(ii) For every execution of the Stellar broadcast over S with the changed line 12 that has a
history H, there exists an execution of Bracha broadcast over (Q,B) with a history H.
5 Lying about Trust Choices
So far we have assumed that faulty servers do not equivocate about their quorum slices, so
that all servers share the same FBQS S. This is unrealistic, since in practice servers find
out about quorum slices of their peers from the peers themselves, and faulty peers may lie.
This may lead di erent servers to have inconsistent information about the quorum slices of
a given faulty server. To capture this, we generalise the notion of an FBQS to allow di erent
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servers to have di erent views on quorum slices. Let us fix the sets of correct and faulty
servers, Vok and Vbad. We say that an indexed family {Sv}vœVok is a subjective FBQS if
each Sv is an FBQS and the di erent FBQSes agree on the quorum slices of correct servers:
’v1, v2, v œ Vok.Sv1(v) = Sv2(v). A subjective FBQS reflects each correct server’s view on
the choices of trust of other servers. We thus sometimes call Sv the view of the server v.
We say that q is u’s slice known by v if q œ Sv(u). Note that a subjective FBQS does not
specify the views of faulty servers, as they are immaterial.
The fact that di erent servers may have inconsistent information about quorum slices
means that the same holds for quorums. Given a subjective FBQS {Sv}vœVok , we say
that U is a quorum known by v when U is a quorum in FBQS Sv. As before, a server
can discover (subjective) quorums by asking its peers for their slices until it finds a set
forming a quorum. A subjective FBQS {Sv}vœVok satisfies quorum intersection if Sv satisfies
quorum intersection for every v that is correct. A subjective FBQS {Sv}vœVok with quorum
intersection induces a subjective quorum system {Qv}vœVok , consisting of the quorums known
by each correct server.
I Example 19. Let V = {1, 2, 3, 4} and assume that 3 is faulty and the rest are correct.
Consider a subjective FBQS defined by the following diagrams:
S1,S4 :
1 2
3 4
S2 :
1 2
3 4
Each server’s slices are determined by the outgoing arrows (we omit self-loops). In the case
of server 1 we have the two slices determined respectively by the solid and the dashed arrows.
Hence, we have
S1(1) = S2(1) = S4(1) = {{1, 2}, {1, 4}}; S1(2) = S2(2) = S4(2) = {{1, 2}};
S1(4) = S2(4) = S4(4) = {{3, 4}}.
The faulty server 3 communicates the slices S1(3) = S4(3) = {{1, 3}} to servers 1 and 4,
and the slices S2(3) = {{2, 3}} to server 2. The above FBQS induces a subjective quorum
system with
Q1 = Q4 = {{1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}; Q2 = {{1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}.
Thus, due to server 3 equivocating, servers 1 and 4 consider {1, 3, 4} a quorum, but server
2 does not.
We next adapt the notion of intact servers to subjective FBQSes by requiring the con-
ditions satisfied by intact servers to hold in any subjective view. Given a subjective FBQS
{Sv}vœVok , the set of intact servers Vint is the biggest set such that
all servers in Vint are correct: Vint flVbad = ÿ;
if Vint is non-empty, then it is a quorum in Sv for each v œ Vok;
for each v œ Vok, Sv|Vint enjoys quorum intersection.
Note that the definition of intact servers depends only on the slices of correct servers in
{Sv}vœVok , which agree across the views Sv of di erent servers v. Hence, the notions of
intact computed from the subjective views of every server coincide with the above notion.
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I Proposition 20. The set of intact servers in a subjective FBQS {Sv}vœVok with quorum
intersection is well-defined and is equal to the set of intact servers in any of Sv.
For instance, the set of intact servers in any of the subjective views in Example 19 is
{1, 2}. As before, servers that are not intact are called befouled.
Using the fact that the views of di erent servers agree on the quorum slices of correct
servers, we can prove the following proposition, which ensures that the intersection of any
two quorums, even when coming from the views of di erent servers, has to contain an intact
node. This proposition generalises Proposition 9 and is key for proving the correctness of
the Stellar broadcast in the subjective setting.
I Proposition 21. Let {Sv}vœVok be a subjective FBQS with quorum intersection and at
least one intact server, and let {Qv}vœVok be its induced subjective quorum system. Then
the intersection of every two quorums in
t
vœVok Qv contains some intact server.
For example, any two quorums in the quorum system from Example 19 intersect at 1,
which is intact.
We can run the Stellar broadcast (with the changes to lines 9, 12 and 15; §4) over a
subjective FBQS {Sv}vœVok by letting each correct server v act according to its FBQS Sv,
which it constructs based on the information provided by its peers. In particular, a setB ™ V
is now considered v-blocking when it overlaps every slice in Sv(v): ’q œ Sv(v). q fl B ”= ÿ.
In this setting, the Stellar broadcast still implements weakly reliable Byzantine broadcast,
defined as before using the above notion of intact.
I Theorem 22. Given sets of correct and faulty servers, Vok and Vbad, let {Sv}vœVok be a
subjective FBQS with quorum intersection and at least one intact server. Then the Stellar
broadcast over this system implements weakly reliable Byzantine broadcast.
We can also establish an analogue of Theorem 15, showing that, when servers accept
quorums they do not belong to, the broadcast guarantees are strengthened.
The above theorem is our key result: it shows that the Stellar broadcast is correct in
the setting of its intended deployment, where servers may have inconsistent information
about the trust choices of their peers. This setting has not been considered by the existing
correctness theorems for Stellar [10]. Note that, like in the idealised setting we considered
earlier, a server in the Stellar broadcast is able to operate when knowing only the quorum
slices of the servers it directly interacts with (even though those reported by faulty servers
may be bogus). Theorem 22 holds because the key lemmas used to prove the correctness of
the Stellar broadcast in the idealised setting can be adjusted to the more general setting we
consider here. The following lemma generalises Lemmas 16 and is used to prove Consistency.
I Lemma 23. Assume a subjective FBQS {Sv}vœVok with quorum intersection and consider
an execution of Stellar broadcast over {Sv}vœVok . If intact servers send messages READY(a)
and READY(aÕ), then a = aÕ.
We prove the above lemma similarly to Lemma 16, but using Proposition 21 instead of
Proposition 9. We prove Totality similarly to the idealised case using the following lemma,
generalising Lemma 17.
I Lemma 24. Let {Sv}vœVok be a subjective FBQS with quorum intersection. Consider an
execution of the Stellar broadcast with the set of intact servers in {Sv}vœVok being Vint ”=
ÿ. Assume that Vint = V + ‡ V ≠ and for some quorum U known by a server v we have
U flVint ™ V +. Then either V ≠ = ÿ or there exists some server vÕ œ V ≠ such that V + is
vÕ-blocking.
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6 Subjective Dissemination Quorum Systems
We have shown that a federated system where servers may lie about their trust choices
generates a system in which every server has its own subjective notion of a quorum. We
now investigate such subjective quorum structures independently from the way they are
generated, which may be useful in the future for dealing with approaches to decentralising
trust di erent from Stellar. To this end, we introduce the notion of a subjective Byzantine
quorum system, where di erent servers may have di erent Byzantine quorum systems.
Let us fix the sets of correct and faulty servers, Vok and Vbad. A subjective Byzantine
quorum system is a pair of two indexed families—a subjective quorum system {Qv}vœVok and
a subjective fail-prone system {Bv}vœVok , where each Bv is a fail-prone system. A subjective
BQS ({Qv}vœVok , {Bv}vœVok) is a subjective DQS when the following properties hold:
SD-safety: ’v œ Vok.÷B œ Bv.Vbad ™ B;
SD-consistency:
’v œ Vok.’U1 œ Qv.’U2 œ
t
vÕœVok QvÕ .’B œ Bv.Vbad ™ B =∆ U1 fl U2 ”™ B; and
SD-availability: each pair (Qv,Bv) with v œ Vok satisfies D-availability.
SD-safety requires that the fail-prone system of each server contains some element that
includes all faulty servers. Such a condition was not part of the previous DQS definition,
but we required it when stating protocol correctness in a particular execution where the set
of faulty servers was fixed (Theorem 3). Since a subjective DQS is already defined in the
context of a fixed set of faulty servers, we add this condition to its definition. SD-consistency
requires that the intersection of a quorum known by a server v with a quorum known by
any other server cannot be completely faulty according to v’s view. To formulate this we
consider only sets B œ Bv that contain all faulty servers; at least one such set is guaranteed
to exist by SD-safety. This requirement ensures that we can generate a subjective DQS from
a subjective FBQS from a view of each correct server as per the mapping in Theorem 10.
I Theorem 25. Given sets of correct and faulty servers, Vok and Vbad, let {Sv}vœVok
be a subjective FBQS with quorum intersection and with at least one intact server, and let
{Qv}vœVok be the subjective quorum system it induces. For each v œ Vok let Bv consist of the
maximal sets B such that the failure of B leaves the set of intact servers in Qv non-empty.
Then ({Qv}vœVok , {Bv}vœVok) is a subjective DQS.
The properties of subjective DQSes are strong enough to execute Bracha broadcast as-
suming each correct server acts according to its view in an arbitrary subjective DQS.
I Theorem 26. Given sets of correct and faulty servers, Vok and Vbad, let
({Qv}vœVok , {Bv}vœVok) be a subjective DQS. Then Bracha broadcast over this system im-
plements reliable Byzantine broadcast.
In the special case when all views of correct servers are the same, a subjective DQS
degenerates into a variant of a usual DQS (Q,B) that satisfies a weaker version of D-
consistency that considers only sets B œ B that include all faulty servers:
’U1, U2 œ Q.’B œ B.Vbad ™ B =∆ U1 fl U2 ”™ B.
Theorem 26 implies that Bracha broadcast is also correct when executed over this DQS vari-
ant, which weakens the classical conditions required for correctness. The following stronger
version of SD-consistency does specialise to D-consistency of DQSes:
’v œ Vok.’U1 œ Qv.’U2 œ
€
vÕœVok
QvÕ .’B œ Bv. U1 fl U2 ”™ B.
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Obviously, Bracha broadcast can also be correctly executed over a subjective DQS satisfying
this property. Finally, Theorems 25 and 26 imply that Bracha broadcast can be executed
over a subjective DQS induced by a subjective FBQS.
I Corollary 27. Given sets of correct and faulty servers, Vok and Vbad, let {Sv}vœVok
be a subjective FBQS with quorum intersection where at least one server is intact. Let
({Qv}vœVok , {Bv}vœVok) be the subjective DQS that this FBQS induces. Then Bracha broad-
cast over this subjective DQS implements reliable Byzantine broadcast.
Note that constructing the fail-prone system Bv required to run Bracha broadcast at
server v requires the server to have a complete (but possibly imperfect) information about
the quorum slices of all servers in the system. Hence, the advantage of the Stellar broadcast
over Bracha broadcast is preserved in the subjective setting.
7 Related Work
Byzantine quorum systems were proposed by Malkhi and Reiter [9], who also demonstrated
how they can be used to implement read-write registers. The generalisation of Bracha
broadcast to dissemination quorum systems in Figure 1 follows the techniques used in [9].
Researchers have also considered quorum systems that provide stronger guarantees than
dissemination ones and studied which quorum systems yield the best performance charac-
teristics [13]. An interesting avenue for future work is to investigate whether other types of
quorum systems can be useful in the federated setting.
The Stellar broadcast as presented in this paper is based on the federated voting pro-
tocol, which is crucial to the Stellar consensus. In the Stellar whitepaper [10] this protocol is
formulated as a form of binary consensus without termination guarantees. The whitepaper
does not establish its relationship to reliable Byzantine broadcast or existing protocols. It
does contain some correctness statements for the federated voting protocol; in particular,
our proof of Totality (Lemma 17) follows the ideas in the whitepaper. However, the ex-
isting proofs only consider the idealised setting where Byzantine servers do not equivocate
about their trust choices, which does not reflect the intended deployment of Stellar. They
furthermore establish weaker safety and liveness properties than us.
8 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we have rigorously studied the basic concepts underlying the Stellar blockchain.
In particular, we have established a formal correspondence between federated and classical
Byzantine quorum systems, and between the federated voting protocol of Stellar and Bracha
protocol for reliable Byzantine broadcast. Our results explicate the main benefit of designing
a broadcast protocol tailored for the federated setting: allowing servers to operate based
on incomplete information. By formalising the relationship between Stellar and Bracha
broadcasts, we were additionally able to show that a variant of the Stellar broadcast closer to
the original Bracha broadcast still allows servers to operate based on incomplete information,
yet provides stronger guarantees.
We have also faithfully captured a realistic setting for deploying Stellar where Byzantine
nodes may equivocate about their trust choices. We have shown that this setting motiv-
ates a generalisation of the classical Byzantine quorum systems that allows nodes to have
inconsistent information about quorums. This may be useful in the future for dealing with
alternative approaches to decentralising trust.
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Our results demonstrate that the purpose of FBQSes is not limited to solving consensus,
for which they were originally proposed. In particular, we believe that apart from broadcast
abstractions, FBQSes can also be used to implement read-write registers on the lines of
existing constructions [1, 9]. Even though in this paper we did not handle the whole of
Stellar consensus protocol, in the future our results should also enable a rigorous analysis
of this protocol and similar ones, such as Ripple [12]. Finally, we hope that the connections
we have established between classical broadcast abstractions and the novel Stellar protocols
will enable transferring ideas from the existing optimised protocols for BFT consensus [6, 8]
into the federated setting.
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APPENDIX 17
A Proofs for §2
I Lemma 28. Consider a DQS (Q,B) and assume that some B œ B contains all the faulty
servers. Then, every quorum in Q contains some correct server.
Proof. By D-availability there is a quorum U in Q that contains only correct servers. Con-
sider an arbitrary quorum U Õ in Q. Since Q is a quorum system, the quorums U and U Õ
intersect. Then, since U contains only correct servers, U Õ contains some correct server. J
I Lemma 29. Assume a DQS (Q,B) and consider an execution of the protocol in Figure 1
such that some B œ B contains all the faulty servers. The first correct server that sends a
READY(a) message first needs to receive ECHO(a) messages from every member of a quorum.
Proof. The READY(a)message may be sent at lines 11 or 14. The case of line 14 is impossible:
since some element of B contains all the faulty servers, a correct server cannot be the first to
send a READY(a) message at this line. Hence, READY(a) is sent at line 11. Then the required
follows from the condition in line 9. J
I Lemma 30. Assume a DQS (Q,B) and consider an execution of the protocol in Figure 1
such that some B œ B contains all the faulty servers. If a correct server delivers a value a,
then some correct server received ECHO(a) messages from every member of a quorum.
Proof. Assume that some correct server delivers value a. Then this server must have received
a quorum of READY(a) messages. By Lemma 28, at least one correct server must have sent
a READY(a) message. By Lemma 29, the first server to do so received a quorum of ECHO(a)
messages. J
I Lemma 31. Assume a DQS (Q,B) and consider an execution of the protocol in Figure 1
such that some B œ B contains all the faulty servers. If correct servers send messages
READY(a) and READY(aÕ), then a = aÕ.
Proof. Assume that correct servers send messages READY(a) and READY(aÕ). Consider the
first correct servers that send the respective messages, v and vÕ. By Lemma 29, v has
received ECHO(a) messages from a quorum U , and vÕ has received ECHO(aÕ) messages from a
quorum U Õ. By D-consistency, U fl U Õ contains some correct server, so that this server has
sent ECHO(a) and ECHO(aÕ). But due to the use of the guard variable echoed in lines 5 and
7, a server only echoes one value, and thus it cannot echo di erent values. Hence, a = aÕ,
as required. J
I Lemma 32. Consider a DQS (Q,B) and assume that some element B œ B contains every
faulty server. Let U be a quorum in Q and let U+ be the set of correct servers in U . Then,
for every B œ B we have U+ ”™ B.
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that U+ ™ B for some B œ B. By D-availability, Q
contains a quorum U Õ ™ V\U+. But then the UflU Õ contains no correct server, contradicting
D-consistency. J
Proof of Theorem 3. No duplication: Straightforward by the use of the guard variable
delivered in line 15.
Integrity: Assume that some correct server delivers value a. By Lemma 30, some correct
server received a quorum of ECHO(a) messages. Then by Lemma 28, at least one cor-
rect server sent ECHO(a). Since the sender is correct, this is only possible if the sender
broadcast a.
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Consistency: Assume that some correct server delivers value a, and some correct server
delivers value aÕ. Then by the condition in line 15, the servers received a quorum of
READY(a), respectively, READY(aÕ) messages. By Lemma 28, either of these quorums
contains some correct server. But then by Lemma 31 we have a = aÕ, as required.
Validity: Assume the sender is correct and broadcasts a. Then every correct server will
eventually send ECHO(a). By D-availability, there exists a quorum U consisting only of
correct servers, so that all the quorum members send ECHO(a). Hence, every member
of U will eventually send READY messages due to the condition in line 9. By Lemma 31
these messages have to carry the value a. Then by the condition in line 15, every correct
server will eventually deliver a value. Due to the Consistency property, this value has to
be a.
Totality: Assume some correct server delivers value a. Then by the condition in line 15 the
server has received READY(a) messages from every member in a quorum U . Consider the
set U+ that contains the correct servers in U . By Lemma 28, U+ ”= ÿ. Every server in
U+ sends READY(a) to every server. By Lemma 32, for every BÕ œ B we have U+ ”™ BÕ.
Therefore, every correct server that has not sent READY messages already will eventually
do so due to the condition in line 12. Due to Lemma 31, all these messages must carry the
value a. Thus, every correct server will eventually send READY(a). Since by D-availability
there exists a quorum consisting only of correct servers, all correct servers will eventually
deliver a value due to the condition in line 15. J
B Proofs for §3
Let S be an FBQS and assume a set of faulty servers Vbad. Let I be a set of servers. We
say that S enjoys
I-correctness: i  all servers in I are correct—i.e., I flVbad = ÿ;
I-availability: i  either I = ÿ or I is a quorum in S; and
I-intersection: i  S|I enjoys quorum intersection.
According to the definition of intact from §3, the set of intact servers Vint is the biggest set
I such that S enjoys the three properties above.
I Lemma 33. Let U be a quorum in an FBQS S, let I be a set of servers, and let U Õ = UflI.
If U Õ ”= ÿ then U Õ is a quorum in S|I .
Proof. Straightforward by the definition of the projection operation. J
I Lemma 34. Let S be an FBQS with quorum intersection. If I1 and I2 are sets such that
S enjoys I1- and I2-availability, and I1- and I2-intersection, then the set I = I1 fi I2 is such
that S also enjoys I-availability and I-intersection.
Proof. It is easy to check that S enjoys I-availability. We next prove that it also enjoys
I-intersection. If one of I1 and I2 is empty, the property holds trivially. Hence, assume that
I1 and I2 are non-empty, and thus are quorums in S. Let Ua and Ub be any two quorums
in S|I . Note that Ua fl I1 and Ua fl I2 cannot both be empty, for otherwise (Ua fl I1) fi
(Ua fl I2) = Ua fl I = Ua would be. Assume that Ua fl I1 ”= ÿ. Then by Lemma 33, Ua fl I1
is a quorum in (S|I)|I1 = S|I1 . Note that the set U = I1 fl I2 is non-empty by quorum
intersection in S. But then, since I2 is a quorum in S, by Lemma 33, U must be a quorum
in S|I1 . Hence, both Ua fl I1 and U are quorums in S|I1 , so that by I1-intersection we have
ÿ ”= (Ua fl I1)flU = Ua fl I1 fl I2 and, thus, Ua fl I2 ”= ÿ. Thus, in all cases we are guaranteed
Ua fl I2 ”= ÿ and, hence, by Lemma 33, Ua fl I2 is a quorum in S|I2 . We can similarly show
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that UbflI2 is a quorum in S|I2 . But since S enjoys I2-intersection, (UaflI2)fl (UbflI2) ”= ÿ,
which is only possible if Ua fl Ub ”= ÿ. Therefore S enjoys I-intersection and the lemma
holds. J
Proof of Proposition 8. By Lemma 34, the set of sets I such that S enjoy I-correctness,
I-availability and I-intersection is closed under union. Therefore, the biggest of such I’s is
the union of all of them, which is unique. J
I Lemma 35. Let S be an FBQS with quorum intersection. For a given set of faulty
servers, let Vint be the corresponding set of intact servers in S. If Vint ”= ÿ, then every
quorum contains some intact server.
Proof. Since Vint ”= ÿ, Vint is a quorum in S. Since S has quorum intersection, Vint
intersects every other quorum in S, which implies the required. J
Proof of Proposition 9. Consider two quorums U1 and U2 in S. Let the set of intact servers
in S be Vint ”= ÿ. By Lemma 35 every quorum contains some intact server. Then both
U1 fl Vint and U2 fl Vint are non-empty and, by Lemma 33, they are quorums in S|Vint .
Since S|Vint enjoys quorum intersection, (U1 flVint) fl (U2 flVint) = (U1 fl U2) flVint ”= ÿ.
But then U1 fl U2 must contain an intact server. J
Proof of Theorem 10. Let us fix a B œ B. Since B is maximal among the sets whose failure
leaves the set of intact servers non-empty, the set V \B is the set of intact servers assuming
that the set of faulty servers is B. Hence, V \B ”= ÿ, S|V\B enjoys quorum intersection and
V \B is a quorum.
We now prove that ’U1, U2 œ Q. U1 fl U2 ”™ B, which establishes that (Q,B) satisfies D-
consistency. By Lemma 33 we know that U1fl(V\B) and U2fl(V\B) are quorums in S|V\B .
Since S|V\B enjoys quorum intersection, (U1fl (V\B))fl (U2fl (V\B)) = (U1flU2)\B ”= ÿ,
and therefore U1 fl U2 ”™ B, as required.
We next prove that ÷U œ Q. B fl U = ÿ, which establishes that (Q,B) satisfies D-
availability. To this end, we let U = V \ B. Then the required follows from the fact that
V \B is a quorum. J
Proof of Corollary 11. Let S be an FBQS with quorum intersection and let (Q,B) be the
DQS it induces according to Theorem 10. Consider an execution of the protocol where at
least one server in S is intact. Since S contains at least one intact server, by the definition
of B, some element of B contains all the faulty servers. Then the required follows from
Theorem 3. J
C Proofs for §4
I Lemma 36. Assume an FBQS S with quorum intersection and consider an execution of
Stellar broadcast such that S contains some intact server. The first intact server that sends
a READY(a) message first needs to receive ECHO(a) messages from every member of a quorum.
Proof. The READY(a)message may be sent at lines 11 or 14. The case of line 14 is impossible:
since by Proposition 12 the set of befouled servers is not v-blocking for any intact server v,
an intact server cannot be the first to send a READY(a) message at this line. Hence, READY(a)
is sent at line 11. Then the required follows from the condition in the changed line 9. J
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I Lemma 37. Let S be an FBQS with quorum intersection. Consider an execution of the
Stellar broadcast such that S contains some intact server. If some correct server delivers
a value a, then some intact server has received ECHO(a) messages from every member of a
quorum.
Proof. Assume that some correct server delivers value a. Then this server must have received
a quorum of READY(a) messages. By Lemma 35, at least one intact server must have sent
a READY(a) message. By Lemma 36, the first intact server to do so received a quorum of
ECHO(a) messages. J
Proof of Lemma 16. Assume that intact servers send messages READY(a) and READY(aÕ).
By Lemma 36, some intact server v has received ECHO(a) from a quorum U , and some intact
server vÕ has received ECHO(aÕ) from a quorum U Õ. By Proposition 9, U fl U Õ contains some
intact server, so that this server has sent ECHO(a) and ECHO(aÕ). But due to the use of the
guard variable echoed in lines 5 and 6, a server only echoes one value, and thus it cannot
echo di erent values. Hence, a = aÕ. J
I Lemma 38. Assume an FBQS S with quorum intersection, and let B be a set of servers
in V. If B is not v-blocking for any v œ V \B, then either B = V or V \B is a quorum in
S.
Proof of Lemma 38. Assume B is not v-blocking for any v œ V\B. Then, for every server
in V \ B, there exists a slice q œ S(v) such that q fl B = ÿ, which implies that q ™ V \ B.
Then either B = V or V \B is a quorum, as required. J
Proof of Lemma 17. Assume that V + is not v-blocking for any v œ V ≠. By Lemma 38,
either V ≠ = ÿ or V ≠ is a quorum in S|Vint . In the former case we are done, while in the
latter we get a contradiction as follows. By Lemma 33, U flVint is a quorum in S|Vint . Since
S|Vint enjoys quorum intersection, we have (U fl Vint) fl V ≠ ”= ÿ. But this is impossible,
since U flVint ™ V + and V + fl V ≠ = ÿ. J
Proof of Theorem 13. No duplication: Straightforward by the use of the guard variable
delivered in the changed line 15.
Integrity: Assume that some correct server delivers value a. By Lemma 37, some intact
server received a quorum of ECHO(a) messages. By Lemma 35, at least one intact server
sent ECHO(a). Since the sender is correct, this is only possible if the sender broadcast a.
Consistency: Assume that some correct server delivers value a and some correct server
delivers value aÕ. Then by the condition in the changed line 15, the servers received
a quorum of READY(a), respectively, READY(aÕ) messages. By Lemma 35, either of these
quorums contains some intact server. But then by Lemma 16 we have a = aÕ, as required.
Validity for intact servers: Assume the sender is correct and broadcasts a. Then every
intact server will eventually send ECHO(a). The set of intact servers Vint is a quorum.
Hence, every intact server will eventually send READY messages due to the condition in
the changed line 9. By Lemma 16, these messages have to carry the value a. Then by
the condition in the changed line 15, every intact server will eventually deliver a value.
Due to the Consistency property, this value has to be a.
Totality for intact servers: Assume some correct server delivers value a. Then by the condi-
tion in the changed line 15 the server has received READY(a) messages from every member
in a quorum U . Since U flVint contains only intact servers, these servers send READY(a)
messages to every server. By the condition in the changed line 12, any correct server
v sends READY(a) messages if it receives READY(a) from every member in a v-blocking
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set. Hence, the READY(a) messages from the servers in U flVint may convince additional
servers to send READY(a) messages to every server. Let these additional servers send
READY(a) messages until a point is reached at which no further intact servers can send
READY(a) messages. At this point, let V + be the set of intact servers that sent READY(a)
messages (where U flVint ™ V +), and let V ≠ = Vint \ V +. By Lemma 16 the servers
in V ≠ did not send any READY messages at all. The set V + cannot be v-blocking for
any server v in V ≠, or else more intact servers could come to send READY(a) messages.
Then by Lemma 17 we have V ≠ = ÿ, meaning that every intact server has sent READY(a)
messages. Since Vint is a quorum, all the intact servers will eventually deliver a value
due to the condition in changed line 15. J
Proof of Lemma 15. By arguments similar to the ones in the proof of Theorem 13, the
protocol enjoys the properties of No duplication, Consistency and Integrity. We prove that
the protocol also enjoys the usual properties of Validity and Totality:
Validity: Assume the sender is correct and broadcasts a. By an argument similar to the
one used for the property of Validity for intact servers in the proof of Theorem 13,
every intact server will eventually deliver value a, which means that some correct server
will eventually deliver value a. Now, by an argument similar to the one used for the
property of Totality for intact servers in the proof of Theorem 13, every intact server
will eventually send READY(a). Then, by the condition in line 15, every correct server
will eventually deliver a value. Due to the Consistency property, this value has to be a.
Totality: Assume some correct server delivers a value a. By an argument similar to the one
used for the property of Totality for intact servers in the proof of Theorem 13, every
intact server will eventually send READY(a). Then, by the condition in line 15, every
correct server will eventually deliver a value. J
I Lemma 39. Let S be an FBQS with quorum intersection and let (Q,B) be the DQS that
S induces. Let an execution of Bracha broadcast over (Q,B) with a history H where some
correct server delivers some value a. Then, there exists an execution of Stellar broadcast
over S with the changed line 12 that also entails H.
Proof. Since a correct server delivered a in Bracha broadcast, by Lemma 30 some correct
server v received ECHO(a) from a quorum U . This means that the first BCASTmessage received
by every correct server in U from the sender client is BCAST(a), and thus H contains the
reception of such messages. By Totality, every correct server eventually delivers a in Bracha
broadcast, and therefore H contains the triggering of such events. Now we construct an
execution of Stellar broadcast that corresponds to H as follows. We let every correct server
in U receive BCAST(a) as the first BCAST message from the client sender. Therefore, every
correct member of U will send ECHO(a) to every server in Stellar broadcast. Additionally,
we let every faulty server in U to also send ECHO(a) messages to every server. Thus, by
the conditions in line 9 of Figure 1, every correct server will eventually send READY(a) to
every server in Stellar broadcast. And by the condition in line 15, every correct server will
eventually deliver a in Stellar broadcast, which corresponds to H and we are done. J
I Lemma 40. Let S be an FBQS with quorum intersection and let (Q,B) be the DQS that
S induces. Let an execution of Stellar broadcast over S with the changed line 12 that has a
history H where some correct server delivers some value a. Then, there exists an execution
of Bracha broadcast over (Q,B) that also entails H.
Proof. Since a correct server delivered a in Stellar broadcast, by Lemma 37 some correct
server v received ECHO(a) from a quorum U . This means that the first BCASTmessage received
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by every correct server in U from the sender client is BCAST(a), and thus H contains the
reception of such messages. By Totality, every correct server eventually delivers a in Stellar
broadcast, and therefore H contains the triggering of such events. Now we construct an
execution of Bracha broadcast that corresponds to H as follows. We let every correct server
in U receive BCAST(a) as the first BCAST message from the client sender. Therefore, every
correct member of U will send ECHO(a) to every server in Bracha broadcast. Additionally,
we let every faulty server in U to also send ECHO(a) messages to every server. Thus, by
the condition in line 9 of Figure 1, every correct server will eventually send READY(a) to
every server in Bracha broadcast. And by the condition in line 15, every correct server will
eventually deliver a in Bracha broadcast, which corresponds to H and we are done. J
I Lemma 41. Let S be an FBQS with quorum intersection and let (Q,B) be the DQS that
S induces. Let an execution of Bracha broadcast over (Q,B) with a history H where no
correct server ever delivers any value. Then, there exists an execution of Stellar broadcast
over S with the changed line 12 that also entails H.
Proof. We show that if no correct server ever delivers any value in the execution of Bracha
broadcast with history H, then no correct server ever delivers any value in any execution
of Stellar broadcast with history H and where faulty servers never send any messages.
Assume towards a contradiction that some correct server delivers a in an execution of Stellar
broadcast where faulty servers never send any messages. Since a correct server delivers a, by
Lemma 37, some intact server receives ECHO(a) messages from every member of a quorum U
in Stellar broadcast. Since the faulty servers do not send any messages in Stellar broadcast,
that means that every member of U is correct, and thusH contains the reception of BCAST(a)
messages from the client sender by every member or U . But then, since the execution of
Bracha broadcast has history H, every member of U will send ECHO(a) in Bracha broadcast,
and by the conditions in lines 9 and 15, every correct server will eventually send READY(a)
to every server, and will eventually deliver a, which contradicts our assumptions. Therefore,
no correct server will ever deliver a in any execution of Stellar broadcast that has history H
and where faulty servers never send any messages, and the lemma holds. J
I Lemma 42. Let S be an FBQS with quorum intersection and let (Q,B) be the DQS that
S induces. Let an execution of Stellar broadcast over S with the changed line 12 that has a
history H where no correct server ever delivers any value. Then, there exists an execution
of Bracha broadcast over (Q,B) that also entails H.
Proof. We show that if no correct server ever delivers any value in the execution of Stellar
broadcast with history H, then no correct server ever delivers any value in any execution
of Bracha broadcast with history H and where faulty servers never send any messages.
Assume towards a contradiction that some correct server delivers a in an execution of Bracha
broadcast where faulty servers never send any messages. Since a correct server delivers a, by
Lemma 30, some intact server receives ECHO(a) messages from every member of a quorum U
in Bracha broadcast. Since the faulty servers do not send any messages in Bracha broadcast,
that means that every member of U is correct, and thusH contains the reception of BCAST(a)
messages from the client sender by every member or U . But then, since the execution of
Stellar broadcast has history H, every member of U will send ECHO(a) in Stellar broadcast,
and by the conditions in lines 9 and 15, every correct server will eventually send READY(a)
to every server, and will eventually deliver a, which contradicts our assumptions. Therefore,
no correct server will ever deliver a in any execution of Bracha broadcast with history H
and where faulty servers never send any messages, and the lemma holds. J
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Proof of Theorem 18. The theorem is a straightforward consequence of Lemmas 39– 42.
J
D Proofs for §5
I Lemma 43. Let {Sv}vœVok be a subjective FBQS with quorum intersection. Assume that
I1 and I2 are sets such that for every v œ Vok, S enjoys I1- and I2-availability, and I1- and
I2-intersection. Then the set I = I1 fi I2 is such that for every v œ Vok, Sv also enjoys
I-availability and I-intersection.
Proof. The required follows from Lemma 34. J
Proof of Proposition 20. Let I be a set such that for every v œ Vok, Sv enjoys I-correctness,
that is, I contains only correct servers. Then for every v1 and v2 in Vok we have Sv1 |I =
Sv2 |I . If I is a quorum in one of the views Sv1 and Sv2 , then I is also a quorum in the other
view. Similarly, if one of Sv1 |I and Sv2 |I enjoys quorum intersection, then so does the other.
Thus, if some view Sv with v œ Vok enjoys I-correctness, I-availability and I-intersection,
then any other view SvÕ with vÕ œ Vok will also enjoy those properties. By Lemma 43, the set
of intact nodes is the union of all sets I such that for every v œ Vok, Sv enjoys I-correctness,
I-availability, and I-intersection. The above-established property implies that this coincides
with the set of intact servers in each Sv with v œ Vok. J
I Lemma 44. Let {Sv}vœVok be a subjective FBQS with quorum intersection and at least
one intact server, and let {Qv}vœVok be its induced subjective quorum system. Then every
quorum in
t
vœVok Qv contains some intact server.
Proof. Since the set of intact servers Vint is non-empty, Vint is a quorum in Sv for each
v œ Vok. Since each Sv has quorum intersection, Vint intersects every quorum in
t
vœVok Qv,
as required. J
Proof of Proposition 21. Consider two quorums U1 and U2 in
t
vœVok Sv. Let the set of
intact servers in {Sv}vœVok be Vint ”= ÿ. By Proposition 20, Vint coincides with the set of
intact servers in each of the views Sv with v œ Vok. By Lemma 44 every quorum contains
some intact server. Then both U1 flVint and U2 flVint are non-empty. Let v1 and v2 be
such that U1 is a quorum in Sv1 and U2 a quorum in Sv2 . By Lemma 33, U1 fl Vint is a
quorum in Sv1 |Vint and U2 flVint is a quorum in Sv2 |Vint . Since the views in a subjective
FBQS agree on the correct servers, then Sv1 |Vint = Sv2 |Vint . Since Sv1 |Vint enjoys quorum
intersection, (U1flVint)fl (U2flVint) = (U1flU2)flVint ”= ÿ. But then U1flU2 must contain
an intact server. J
I Proposition 45. Assume a subjective FBQS {Sv}vœVok with quorum intersection. Its set
of befouled servers Vbef is not v-blocking for any intact v.
Proof. Consider an intact server v. The set of all intact servers Vint = V\Vbef is a quorum
in Sv. Then there exists a slice q œ Sv(v) such that q ™ Vint. Hence, Vbef cannot overlap
all of v’s slices known by v itself, as required. J
I Lemma 46. Assume a subjective FBQS {Sv}vœVok with quorum intersection and consider
an execution of Stellar broadcast such that {Sv}vœVok contains some intact server. The first
intact server v that sends a READY(a) message first needs to receive ECHO(a) messages from
every member of a quorum in Sv.
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Proof. The READY(a)message may be sent at lines 11 or 14. The case of line 14 is impossible:
since by Proposition 45 the set of befouled servers is not v-blocking for any intact server v,
an intact server cannot be the first to send a READY(a) message at this line. Hence, READY(a)
is sent at line 11. Then the required follows from the condition in the changed line 9. J
I Lemma 47. Let {Sv}vœVok be a subjective FBQS with quorum intersection where at least
one server is intact. If some correct server in an execution of the Stellar broadcast delivers
a value a, then some intact server v has received ECHO(a) messages from every member of a
quorum known by v.
Proof. Assume that some correct server delivers a value a. Then this server must have
received READY(a) messages from a quorum it knows. By Lemma 44, at least one intact
server must have sent a READY(a) message. By Lemma 46, the first intact server v to do so
received ECHO(a) messages from a quorum known by v. J
Proof of Lemma 23. Assume that intact servers send messages READY(a) and READY(aÕ).
By Lemma 46, some intact server v has received ECHO(a) from a quorum U known by
v, and some intact server vÕ has received ECHO(aÕ) from a quorum U Õ known by vÕ. By
Proposition 21, U fl U Õ contains some intact server, so that this server has sent READY(a)
and READY(aÕ). But due to the use of the guard variable echoed in lines 5 and 6, a server
only echoes one value, and thus it cannot echo di erent values. Hence, a = aÕ. J
Proof of Lemma 24. Since every intact server is correct, all the views Sv|Vint with v œ Vok
coincide with each other. Since V + and V ≠ only contain intact servers, they both lie within
the subsystem Sv|Vint . Thus, for every v œ V +, V ≠ is v-blocking in {Sv}vœVok—in the sense
of §5—i  V ≠ is v-blocking in any SvÕ |Vint with vÕ œ Vok—in the sense of §4. Assume that
V + is not v-blocking for any v œ V ≠ in {Sv}vœVok . Then V + is not v-blocking for any
v œ V ≠ in some SvÕ |Vint with vÕ œ Vok. By Lemma 38, either V ≠ = ÿ or V ≠ is a quorum in
SvÕ |Vint . In the former case we are done, while in the latter we get a contradiction as follows.
By Lemma 33, U fl Vint is a quorum in Sv|Vint = SvÕ |Vint . Since SvÕ |Vint enjoys quorum
intersection, we have U flVint fl V ≠ ”= ÿ. But this is impossible, since U flVint ™ V + and
V + fl V ≠ = ÿ. J
Proof of Theorem 22. No duplication: Straightforward by the use of the guard variable
delivered in the changed line 15.
Integrity: Assume that some correct server delivers value a. By Lemma 47, some intact
server received ECHO(a) messages form a quorum it knows. By Lemma 44, at least one
intact server sent ECHO(a). Since the sender is correct, this is only possible if the sender
broadcast a.
Consistency: Assume that some correct server delivers value a and some correct server
delivers value aÕ. Then by the condition in the changed line 15, the servers received
READY(a) and READY(aÕ) from quorums known by each of the servers, respectively. By
Lemma 44, either of these quorums contains some intact server. But then by Lemma 23
we have a = aÕ, as required.
Validity for intact servers: Assume the sender is correct and broadcasts a. Then every intact
server will eventually send ECHO(a). The set of intact servers Vint is a quorum in Sv for
every v œ Vok. Hence, every intact server will eventually send READY messages due to
the condition in the changed line 9. By Lemma 23, these messages have to carry the
value a. Then by the condition in the changed line 15, every intact server will eventually
deliver a value. Due to the Consistency property, this value has to be a.
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Totality for intact servers: Assume some correct server delivers value a. Then by the condi-
tion in the changed line 15 the server has received READY(a) messages from every member
in a quorum U it knows. Since U flVint contains only intact servers, these servers send
READY(a) messages to every server. By the condition in the changed line 12, any cor-
rect server v sends READY(a) messages if it receives READY(a) from every member in a
v-blocking set. Hence, the READY(a) messages from the servers in U flVint may convince
additional servers to send READY(a) messages to every server. Let these additional serv-
ers send READY(a) messages until a point is reached at which no further intact servers
can send READY(a) messages. At this point, let V + be the set of intact servers that sent
READY(a) messages (where U flVint ™ V +), and let V ≠ = Vint \ V +. By Lemma 23 the
servers in V ≠ did not send any READY messages at all. The set V + cannot be v-blocking
for any server v in V ≠, or else more intact servers could come to send READY(a) messages.
Then by Lemma 24 we have V ≠ = ÿ, meaning that every intact server has sent READY(a)
messages. Since Vint is a quorum in Sv for every v œ Vok, all the intact servers will
eventually deliver a value due to the condition in changed line 15. J
E Proofs for §6
Proof of Theorem 25. Each pair (Qv,Bv) with v œ Vok is a DQS, and thus it satisfies
D-availability. For each v œ Vok, the fail-prone system Bv contains the maximal sets such
that their failure leaves the set of intact servers in Qv non-empty. Since {Sv}vœVok contains
some intact server, then the set Vbef of befouled servers is the only element that contains all
faulty servers in each of the fail-prone systems Bv with v œ Vok. This entails that (Qv,Bv)
enjoys SD-safety. By the construction of {Qv,B}vœVok , for every v œ Vok the only element
B œ Bv that contains all faulty servers, only contains befouled servers. SD-consistency holds
because by Proposition 21 the intersection of any two quorums, coming from the same or
di erent views, contains some intact server. J
I Lemma 48. Consider a subjective DQS ({Qv}vœVok , {B}vœVok). Then for every v œ Vok,
every quorum in Qv contains some correct server.
Proof. Let us fix a v œ Vok. By SD-safety some element B œ Bv contains all faulty servers.
Then by D-availability in (Qv,Bv), there is a quorum U in Qv that contains only correct
servers. Consider an arbitrary quorum U Õ in Qv. Since Qv is a quorum system, the quorums
U and U Õ intersect. Then, since U contains only correct servers, U Õ contains some correct
server. J
I Lemma 49. Assume a subjective DQS ({Qv}vœVok , {B}vœVok) and consider an execution
of the protocol in Figure 1. The first correct server v that sends a READY(a) message first
needs to receive ECHO(a) messages from every member of a quorum known by v.
Proof. The READY(a)message may be sent at lines 11 or 14. The case of line 14 is impossible:
since some element of Bv contains all the faulty servers, a correct server cannot be the first to
send a READY(a) message at this line. Hence, READY(a) is sent at line 11. Then the required
follows from the condition in line 9. J
I Lemma 50. Assume a subjective DQS ({Qv}vœVok , {B}vœVok) and consider an execution
of the protocol in Figure 1. If some correct server delivers a value a, then some correct
server v received ECHO(a) messages from every member of a quorum known by v.
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Proof. Assume that some correct server delivers value a. Then this server must have received
READY(a) messages from a quorum known by the server. By Lemma 48, at least one correct
server must have sent a READY(a) message. By Lemma 49, the first server v to do so received
ECHO(a) messages from a quorum known by v. J
I Lemma 51. Assume a subjective DQS ({Qv}vœVok , {BvœVok}) and consider an execution
of the protocol in Figure 1. If correct servers send messages READY(a) and READY(aÕ), then
a = aÕ.
Proof. Assume that correct servers send messages READY(a) and READY(aÕ). Consider the
first correct servers that send the respective messages, v and vÕ. By Lemma 49, v has
received ECHO(a) messages from a quorum U œ Qv, and vÕ has received ECHO(aÕ) messages
from a quorum U Õ œ QvÕ . By SD-safety, some element B œ Bv contains all faulty servers.
By SD-consistency, U fl U Õ ”™ B, and thus U fl U Õ contains some correct server, so that this
server has sent ECHO(a) and ECHO(aÕ). But due to the use of the guard variable echoed in
lines 5 and 7, a server only echoes one value, and thus it cannot echo di erent values. Hence,
a = aÕ, as required. J
I Lemma 52. Consider a subjective DQS ({Qv}vœVok , {B}vœVok). Let v œ Vok and let U
be a quorum in Qv. Let U+ be the set of correct servers in U . Then for every vÕ œ Vok and
every BÕ œ BvÕ we have U+ ”™ BÕ.
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that for some vÕ œ Vok and BÕ œ BvÕ we have
U+ ™ BÕ. By D-availability in (QvÕ ,BvÕ) we know that QvÕ contains a quorum U Õ ™ V\U+.
By SD-safety, some element B œ Bv contains all faulty servers. Since U+ only contains
correct servers, (U fl U Õ) \ B ™ U+ fl (U Õ \ B) ™ U+ fl U Õ. But U+ fl U Õ = ÿ, which implies
that U fl U Õ ™ B, thus contradicting SD-consistency. J
Proof of Theorem 26. No duplication: Straightforward by the use of the guard variable
delivered in line 15.
Integrity: Assume that some correct server delivers value a. By Lemma 50, some correct
server received ECHO(a) messages from a quorum known by that correct server. Then by
Lemma 48, at least one correct server sent ECHO(a). Since the sender is correct, this is
only possible if the sender broadcast a.
Consistency: Assume that some correct server delivers value a, and some correct server deliv-
ers value aÕ. Then by the condition in line 15, the servers received READY(a) and READY(aÕ)
messages form quorums known by each of the servers respectively. By Lemma 48, either
of these quorums contains some correct server. But then by Lemma 51 we have a = aÕ,
as required.
Validity: Assume the sender is correct and broadcasts a. Then every correct server will
eventually send ECHO(a). For every v œ Vok there exists a quorum Uv œ Qv consisting
only of correct servers, due to SD-safety and D-availability in (Qv,Bv). Hence, all mem-
bers of each Uv will send ECHO(a). Hence, every correct server will eventually send READY
messages due to the condition in line 9. By Lemma 51, all these messages must carry
the value a. Then, since there exists a quorum consisting only of correct servers in each
Qv, by the condition in line 15, every correct server will eventually deliver a value. Due
to the Consistency property, this value has to be a.
Totality: Assume some correct server delivers value a. Then by the condition in line 15
the server has received READY(a) messages from every member in a quorum U it knows.
Consider the set U+ that contains the correct servers in U . By Lemma 48, U+ ”= ÿ.
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Every server in U+ sends READY(a) to every server. By Lemma 52, for every v œ Vok
and every BÕ œ Bv we have U+ ”™ BÕ. Therefore, every correct server that has not sent
READY messages already will eventually do so due to the condition in line 12. Due to
Lemma 51, all these messages must carry the value a. Thus, every correct server will
eventually send READY(a). For every v œ Vok there exists a quorum Uv œ Qv consisting
only of correct servers, due to SD-safety and D-availability in (Qv,Bv). Therefore, all
correct servers will eventually deliver a value due to the condition in line 15. J
Proof of Corollary 27. By Theorems 25 and 26. J
